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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has discretion to exercise certiorari 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(5). 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that 
"plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care when she did not 
have an in-depth inspection of the swimming pool completed" and, 
therefore, that the trial court properly granted defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. Because summary judgment presents 
only questions of law, the Court of Appeals properly reviewed the 
trial court's order for correctness. Memorandum Decision 
attached hereto as Addendum 2 at page 1 (citing Carter v. Mil ford 
Valley Mem91 Hosp., 996 P.2d 1076 (Utah App. 2000)). When 
exercising its certiorari jurisdiction, this Court reviews the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness giving no 
deference to its conclusions of law. Bear River Mutual Ins. V. 
Wall, 978 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah 1999) (citing Newspaper Agency Corp. 
v. Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997)). 
This issue was preserved in plaintiff's Response to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 114-132) 
CONTROLLING STATUTES. ETC. 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, or regulations. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. N a t u r e 1,1-1 I in-1 i .ri'je I 
T h i s i 5 a c t i o n -for danvujes in irjiiich p l a i n t i f f a s s e r t s , 
inl-^ r al* * claim n fraudulent nondisclosi w . 
defendants iisclose the existence know . leaks In 
'. !":*•? backyard swimming pool which Lhey s< . - plaintiff, ' ra 
- j - ; •- ourt aranted summary judgment in I t\o\ • ;ej* «ii: * 
determining Defendants knew of * .o [leaks, <i * 
caveat emptor, Defendants i^c1 legal duty • 
11
 See Addendum :i The Utah Cu.. ? - *,.pf - • ..:4 .:T;ed. 
See Addendum z. 
II. Statement of Facts 
1. about September 25, 1995, plaintiff purchased a 
home from defendants (.i-catod at 2820 East Robidoux Road, Sandy, 
Utah, which included a backyard sw i mm i n< (R, '.I) 
2. the time of sale, there were a number of leaK--*, 
both the piping and t IP; body <-i the swimming pool. (R. 1^9- L30, 
135) 
3. P f : f * i ; , n knowledge of the leaks when she 
purchased tie proper ) 
Plaintiff would ** . */e purchased the property or would 
no < *-\\i price c;ho paid for the property Had she been 
aware of the leaks. 
F), Defendants were aware ol the IIMK:-:. , \frt failed to 
disc It.:,-. hwir existence to plaintiff, (R. I i'») 
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6. The Real Estate Purchase Contract entered into by the 
parties authorized plaintiff to inspect the property. (R. 52) 
7. Plaintiff inspected the property herself and hired a 
professional inspection company, AmeriSpec-Salt Lake, to inspect 
the property for her. (R. 52-53) 
8. AmeriSpec found the pool area and equipment covered by 
the inspection to be in working order. However, the inspection 
report was qualified: 
Our review is limited to above ground or visible items only. 
It is an operational inspection of the accessible equipment 
and components and is therefore limited in scope. If 
concerned, client is advised to have a licensed pool company 
perform an in-depth review and/or service. 
(R. 107) 
9. Plaintiff had no reason to be concerned and did not 
arrange for an in-depth review of the swimming pool. (R. 131) 
10. An in-depth review of the pool would have revealed the 
leaks. (R. 108-109) 
11. Plaintiff and her husband inspected the pool on a 
number of occasions prior to closing the purchase transaction. 
During each of those inspections, the pool was full of water and 
there was no visible indication that the pool leaked. (R. 127, 
131) 
12. Plaintiff commenced this action against defendants on 
July 30, 1997. In her Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff seeks 
damages based, inter alia, upon defendants1 fraudulent 
nondisclosure of the existence of the swimming pool leaks. (R. 
32-34) 
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3 3. Defendants filed their Motion for Summary «:i i ldgment 01 :i 
• lu ly w, 199R (R, 110-112) Plaintiff filed her Response to 
defendants' Motion for * :y.. t 4 ; *9B -•<, 
114-132),, arid defendants filed a reply memorandu . • - , 
Defendants1 Mot KM. I< I Sunmat y . ""uhjiiient- was based upon 
their contention that, even ' they were aware at the leaks, i hoy 
had no duty !;!/; disclose them to plaintiff because plaintiff could 
have discovered them for herself t:!irou'ih Hie exercise reasonable 
care. According to defendants, even though plaintitl and tier 
husbanc ••-.-,•' • - ed -• i MH- additional step of 
hiring i professional inspectioi .. pect the property, 
i i i * plaintiff's failure have a licensed puoi 
company per review of ^u^ y was unreasonable. 
(R. 56-57) 
15. On March 18, 1999, the trial court granted defendants1 
Motion for Summary .Ndqiueiit , i u I ing as follows: 
Having reviewed all affidavits and memoranda that pertain to 
the Motion, and Plaintiff having waived oral argument, this 
Court has concluded that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Specifically, this Court finds that 
Plaintiff had a duty and opportunity to conduct a thorough 
inspection of the pool and failed to do so. Under these 
circumstances, even if Defendants knew of the defects, based 
on caveat emptor, Defendants did not have a legal duty to 
disclose. 
( U 1 l:>0) {See Addendum 1) 
1.6. . •? :i .." .. s f-i..Mi *t Memorandum Decision 
affirming 4re trial court's ruling * /tHm < See Addendum 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In a vendor-vendee transaction the vendor may have a duty to 
disclose known defects which are not discoverable by reasonable 
care. First Security Bank v„ Banberry Development, 786 P.2d 
1326, 1331 (Utah 1990)); Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802, 804 
(Utah 1963); Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 
570, 579 (Utah App. 1994). 
In the case at bar, defendants knew their swimming pool had 
a pervasive problem with leaks when they sold it to plaintiff, 
yet they failed to disclose that fact. Defendants contend, 
however, that they owed no duty of disclosure because plaintiff 
could have discovered the leaks for herself through the exercise 
of reasonable care. 
It is undisputed that plaintiff did in fact exercise care by 
inspecting the pool herself and by hiring a professional 
inspection company to inspect the pool for her. The Court of 
Appeals, however, held that the care exercised by plaintiff was 
not reasonable. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that 
plaintiff's duty of reasonable care required her to take the 
further step of obtaining an "in-depth inspection of the swimming 
pool." Addendum 2 at page 2. Plaintiff respectfully submits 
that the Court of Appeals' ruling was erroneous. It is difficult 
to conceive of a defective condition which could not be 
discovered by an in-depth inspection. Accordingly, acceptance of 
the Court of Appeals' decision would all but eliminate the cause 
of action for fraudulent non-disclosure recognized in BanJberry, 
5 
Elder, and Maack. 
ARGUMENT 
Adoption of the Court of Appeals' view of reasonable care 
would render it virtually impossible to bring a cause of 
action for fraudulent nondisclosure. 
Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have recognized 
that in a vendor-vendee transaction the vendor may have a duty to 
disclose known defects which are not discoverable by reasonable 
care. See First Security Bank v. Banjberry Development, 786 P.2d 
1326, 1331 (Utah 1990)); Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802, 804 
(Utah 1963); and Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 
P.2d 570, 579 (Utah App. 1994) .* "[W]hether a duty to speak 
exists is determinable by reference to all the circumstances of 
the case and by comparing the facts not disclosed with the object 
and end in view by the contracting parties." BanJberry 
Development, 786 P.2d at 1328 (quoting Elder, 384 P.2d at 804). 
Whether a duty to speak exists is also a question of law. 
xThis duty has been recognized by courts in many other 
jurisdictions as well. See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d 
625, 629 (Fla. 1985)("where the seller of a home knows of facts 
materially affecting the property which are not readily 
observable and are not known to the buyer, the seller is under a 
duty to disclose them to the buyer."); Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 
1115, 1118 (Ariz. App. 1986)(modern view is that vendor has an 
affirmative duty to disclose material facts necessary to correct 
a mistake as to a basic assumption on which buyer is making the 
contract and nondisclosure amounts to a failure to act in good 
faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair 
dealing); and Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal.Rptr. 201, 204 (Cal. 
1963)("[W]here the seller knows of facts materially affecting the 
value or desirability of the property which are known or 
accessible only to him and also knows that such facts are not 
known to, or within the reach of the diligent attention and 
observation of the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose 
them to the buyer"). 
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BanJberry Development, 786 P.2d at 1329. 
In the case at bar, defendants knew yet failed to disclose 
to plaintiff that their swiiiaining pool had a pervasive problem 
with leaks. They contend, however, that they owed no duty to 
inform plaintiff of the leaks because plaintiff could have 
discovered them for herself by exercising reasonable care. The 
trial court agreed with defendants, explaining that plaintiff 
"had a duty and opportunity to conduct a thorough inspection of 
the pool and failed to do so." Addendum 1 at page 1. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed, concluding that "plaintiff failed to 
exercise reasonable care when she did not have an in-depth 
inspection of the swimming pool completed..." Addendum 2 at page 
2. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the conclusions of both 
lower courts should be rejected. 
It is undisputed that plaintiff did in fact exercise care by 
inspecting the pool herself and by hiring a professional 
inspection company to inspect the pool for her. As set forth 
above, however, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintifffs 
duty of care required her to take the additional step of 
obtaining an "in-depth inspection of the swimming pool." 
Addendum 2 at page 2. In reaching its conclusion, the Court of 
Appeals1 relied on the Amerispec report obtained by plaintiff 
which states as follows: 
Our review is limited to above ground or visible items only. 
It is an operational inspection of the accessible equipment 
and components and is therefore limited in scope. If 
concerned, client is advised to have a licensed pool company 
perform an in-depth review and/or service. 
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(R. 107)(emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, plaintiff had no reason to be concerned and, 
consequently, did not arrange for an in-depth review of the 
swimming pool. Plaintiff respectfully submits that it was 
reasonable for her not to do so; it is simply not practical for a 
buyer to obtain an in-depth inspection of every aspect of a home. 
In ruling to the contrary, however, what the Court of Appeals has 
essentially concluded is that unless the buyer does perform an 
in-depth inspection of every aspect of the home, then, by 
definition, the buyer has failed to exercise reasonable care with 
respect to any aspect which later turns out to be defective. 
That, however, is not the rule of law recognized in Banberry, 
Elder, and Maack} nor in any other decision of which plaintiff is 
aware. And for good reason: it is difficult to conceive of a 
defective condition which could not be discovered by an in-depth 
inspection. Accordingly, acceptance of the Court of Appeals' 
decision would all but eliminate the cause of action for 
fraudulent nondisclosure. 
For example, termite damage could easily be discovered by a 
professional termite inspector. Nevertheless, in Horsch v. 
Termlnix Intern. Co., 865 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (Kan. App. 1993), a 
case cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Maack, the 
Kansas court held that termite damage was a material defect which 
the seller would be required to disclose. 
Likewise, in Quashnock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 121, 127-128 (Pa. 
1982), despite the fact that the buyer failed to obtain any 
8 
professional inspection of the property of any kind, the Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania found a duty of disclosure where "termite 
infestation would not have been ascertainable by an untrained 
buyer." 
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 551 
provides the following illustrations of cases warranting the 
imposition of liability for fraudulent non-disclosure 
notwithstanding the fact that the defective condition could be 
discovered by an in-depth inspection: 
3. A sells to B a dwelling house, without disclosing to B 
the fact that the house is riddled with termites. This is a 
fact basic to the transaction [which must be disclosed]. 
9. A sells B a dwelling house, without disclosing the fact 
that drain tile under the house is so constructed that at 
periodic intervals water accumulates under the house. A 
knows that B is not aware of this fact, that he could not 
discover it by an ordinary inspection, and that he would not 
make the purchase if he knew it. A knows also that B 
regards him as an honest and fair man and one who would 
disclose any such fact if he knew it. A is subject to 
liability to B for his pecuniary loss in an action for 
deceit. 
(Emphasis added). 
Finally, comment I to section 551 provides the following 
example of a case where there is liability for non-disclosure: 
...a seller who knows that his cattle are infected with tick 
fever or contagious abortion is not free to unload them on 
the buyer and take his money, when he knows that the buyer 
is unaware of the fact, could not easily discover it, would 
not dream of entering into a bargain if he knew and is 
relying upon seller's good faith and common honesty to 
disclose any such fact if it is true. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 551, comment 2. 
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In each of the above sets of facts, it is apparent that the 
buyer would be able to discover the defective condition by an in-
depth inspection of the property and, in the Court of Appeals' 
view, failing to do so would have no claim for fraudulent 
nondisclosure against the seller. As the cited authorities 
indicate, however, that view is contrary to the law. In Elders, 
this Court specifically rejected the suggestion that the 
plaintiffs should have conducted any independent investigation at 
all, let alone an in-depth investigation: "There was no occasion 
for [the plaintiffs] to make an independent investigation of a 
quarantine of which they knew nothing." 384 P.2d at 804. 
Likewise, in the case at bar, plaintiff had no occasion to obtain 
an "in-depth inspection" for leaks of which she knew nothing and 
about which she had no reason to be concerned. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests that 
the Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and 
that this action be remanded to the Court of Appeals with 
instructions for remand to the trial court for a trial on the 
merits. 
DATED this /U day of January, 2001. 
Sott W. Mitchell 
(ttorney for Plaintiff 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Undersigned/certifies that two copies of the foregoing were 
mailed this /(j^^Y of January, 2001, via first class U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
George E, Harris, Jr. 
Gateway Tower East, Suite^00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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Addendum 1 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
George E. Harris, Jr. (4781) 
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Defendants 
FIlEfieiTOlCT COURT 
Third Juuicfef District 
MAK 
^COUNT^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, DIVISION II 
* * * * * * * 
DORANN MITCHELL, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
JESSE CHRISTENSEN and BETTY 
CHRISTENSEN, 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970006149 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * 
Before this Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "Motion"), filed July 22, 1998, Having reviewed 
all affidavits and memoranda that pertain to the Motion, and 
Plaintiff having waived oral argument, this Court has concluded 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Specifically, this Court finds that Plaintiff had a duty and 
opportunity to conduct a thorough inspection of the pool and 
failed to do so. Under these circumstances, even if Defendants 
knew of the defects, based on caveat emptor, Defendants did not 
have a legal duty to disclose. 
According,
 p u r s u a n t t o B u l e 
DATED this _^£ day of „arch, „ „ , 
COURT: 
Addendum 2 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Dorann Mitchell, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
FILED 
JUN 0 8 2000 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Jesse Christensen and Betty 
Christensen, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 990321-CA 
F I L E D 
( J u n e 8 , 2 0 0 0 ) 
2000 UT App 170 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
Attorneys: Scott B. Mitchell, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
George E. Harris Jr. and Jennifer Ward, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Plaintiff Dorann Mitchell appeals the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in defendants' favor. "!Because a summary 
judgment presents questions of law, we review the trial court's 
ruling for correctness.1" Carter v. Milford Valley Memfl Hosp., 
2000 UT App 21,1112, 996 P.2d 1076 (citation omitted). 
Plaintiff asserts defendants are guilty of fraudulent 
nondisclosure, arguing that because defendants knew of the leak 
in the swimming pool, they had a duty to disclose this fact to 
her. To succeed on a claim of fraudulent nondisclosure, the 
party asserting the claim must show that "the nondisclosed 
information [is] material, known to the party failing to 
disclose, and [that] there [is] a legal duty to communicate." 
Maack v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 578 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). l![T]he duty to disclose in a vendor-vendee 
transaction exists only where a defect is not discoverable by 
reasonable care." Id. at 579. 
Plaintiff concedes that "[a]n in-depth review of the pool 
would have revealed the leaks." Notwithstanding, plaintiff 
argues that she acted reasonably by personally inspecting the 
pool with her husband, and by having a professional home 
inspection done. However, neither plaintiff nor her husband 
claim to have the skill necessary to identify potential problems 
with a swimming pool. Furthermore, the home inspection company 
specifically limited its inspection of the swimming pool to the 
"above ground or visible items only" and cautioned that its 
inspection of the pool was "limited in scope." 
Thus, we cannot say that plaintiff's failure to have an in-
depth inspection of the swimming pool was reasonable. The fact 
that plaintiff was sufficiently knowledgeable in the process of 
buying a home to have a detailed home inspection completed and 
the fact that she concedes that an in-depth inspection of the 
swimming pool would have revealed the defects "further highlights 
the unreasonable nature of [plaintiff!s] actions in not obtaining 
an inspection, or insisting on express rights in the [purchase 
contract]." Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at 579 n.8 
(stating that factual issue of whether defects would have been 
discoverable by home inspection was resolved by plaintiffs' 
concession in appellate brief that inspection would have revealed 
defects) . Therefore, because plaintiff failed to exercise 
reasonable care when she did not have an in-depth inspection of 
the swimming pool completed, the trial court correctly granted 
summary judgment on this issuer. See id. at 578 (stating that 
issue of whether there was legal duty to communicate is question 
of law). 
Plaintiff suggests that defendants fraudulently concealed 
the leak in the pool by keeping it full of water during 
plaintiff's inspection of the premises. Fraudulent concealment 
is defined as follows: "One party to a transaction who by 
concealment, or other action intentionally prevents the other from 
acquiring material information is subject to the same liability 
to the other, for pecuniary loss as though he had stated the 
nonexistence of the matter the other was thus prevented from 
discovering." Id. (citation omitted). 
In fraudulent concealment cases, 
summary judgment [is] appropriate only if (i) 
"the facts are so clear that reasonable 
persons could not disagree about the 
underlying facts or about the application of 
the governing legal standard to the facts or" 
(ii) "the facts underlying the allegation of 
fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, vague, 
or insufficiently established that they fail 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to concealment." 
Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 
1273, 1279 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). 
990321-CA 
Here, plaintifffs only allegation purportedly supporting a 
claim of fraudulent concealment is that defendants kept their 
swimming pool full of water. Considering that the majority of 
swimming pool owners do just that, and the absence of water would 
seem the most effective way to disguise a leak, this assertion 
does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
defendants did so to fraudulently conceal the leak. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs fraudulent concealment claim fails. 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
defendants is affirmed. 
James' &. Davig^ 
WE CONCUR: 
Korman H. Jackson, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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